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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






SERGEANT DANIELLE ALSTON, 




CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, d/b/a Philadelphia Police Department;  
LIEUTENANT BRIAN DOUGHERTY, individually and in his official capacity  
as lieutenant for the Philadelphia Police Department 
______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-18-cv-02362 
District Judge: Honorable Joshua D. Wolson 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2021 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 










SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 
 Danielle Alston, a former Sergeant with the Philadelphia Police Department, 
filed suit against her immediate superior, Lieutenant Brian Dougherty, and the City 
of Philadelphia, alleging, inter alia, a gender-based hostile-environment claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl., 971 F.3d 416, 426 (3d Cir. 
2020) (“The Equal Protection Clause proscribes sex-based discrimination.”).  
Sergeant Alston’s claims against the City were dismissed.  22A.  In response to 
Lieutenant Dougherty’s motion for summary judgment, Sergeant Alston 
abandoned one claim, opposing only the motion seeking summary judgment on her 
gender-based hostile-environment claim.  205-06A.  After the District Court 
granted Lieutenant Dougherty’s motion for summary judgment, this timely appeal 
followed.1   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s order granting summary 




 Section 1983 hostile-environment claims “require the same elements of proof 
as a Title VII action.”  Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1983); see also Starnes, 971 F.3d at 426.  In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, this 
Court instructed that: 
five constituents must converge to bring a successful claim for a sexually 
hostile work environment under Title VII (1) the employees suffered 
intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was 
pervasive and regular;2 (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the 
plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person 
of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior 
liability. 
 
895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 
260 (3d Cir. 2001) (reiterating same elements to prove hostile work environment 
claim).   
 In analyzing Sergeant Alston’s claim, the District Court considered the first 
and fifth elements.  It concluded that Sergeant Alston could not support her claim 
with evidence of an errant text message that Lieutenant Dougherty sent to her 
because there was “[n]o evidence” suggesting that the text was sent 
“intentionally.”  6A.  It noted that the record did not contradict Lieutenant 
Dougherty’s assertion that the text was sent by accident and that the lieutenant 
apologized in both a follow-up text and in person.  Id.   
 
2 We have clarified since Andrews that the second element is whether the discrimination 




 Sergeant Alston contends this was error as the incident was “sufficiently 
severe to create a hostile work environment,” Alston Br. 13, and she points to her 
own testimony that she was “shocked,” id. at 15.  We are not persuaded.  Alston’s 
subjective view of the errant text does not create an issue of fact about Lieutenant 
Dougherty’s state of mind when the text was transmitted.  Although she is correct 
that a single incident may be severe enough to create a hostile environment, 
Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264, the severity of the sole, misfired text at issue here 
does not shed light on whether Dougherty acted intentionally.     
 Thus, we turn to Sergeant Alston’s other contention that the District Court 
erred when it concluded that Alston failed to establish the existence of respondeat 
superior liability for the hostile environment created by some of the other sergeants 
and officers in the 35th District to which she was assigned.  We have carefully 
reviewed the record before us, and conclude that the evidence establishes that some 
other officers were aware of some gender-based harassment of which Sergeant 
Alston complains.  But the record does not show that Lieutenant Dougherty had 
actual or constructive notice of the gender-based harassment directed at Sergeant 
Alston.  While Alston testified that she had ongoing conversations with Dougherty, 
she did not spell out the substance of those conversations and she admitted that she 
did not inform him of the other officers’ harassing comments related to her 




determined that Sergeant Alston failed to show a basis for holding Lieutenant 
Dougherty liable. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
  
 
